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NOTE
"THERE BE NO SHELTER HERE"*:
ANTI-IMMIGRANT HOUSING ORDINANCES AND
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
Daniel Eduardo Guzmdn**
This Note examines anti-immigrant housing ordinances (AIHOs)
that explicitly single out immigrants and facially-neutral AIHOs that lo-
cal officials use to target immigrants. Lozano v. City of Hazleton
(Lozano II) underscores how effective preemption-doctrine-based chal-
lenges can be against municipalities that have local ordinances singling
out immigrants. On the other hand, immigrant-rights groups have had
little success bringing legal challenges against municipalities that use
facially-neutral housing ordinances to target immigrants because such
ordinances are enacted pursuant to traditional state powers, and ex-
empted from regulation under the Fair Housing Act. As a result, munici-
palities will circumvent preemption-doctrine-based challenges to their
ordinances by moving towards facially-neutral ordinances that target
immigrant housing patterns just as effectively (either by tightening
household occupancy restrictions or discriminatorily enforcing the ordi-
nances). This Note argues that the only effective way to challenge state
and local anti-immigrant activism is to grapple with both kinds of
AIHOs. An effective solution would work towards distinguishing federal
interests in the regulation of immigration from state interests in housing
and other traditional state powers. The federal government should ex-
tend its role in regulating immigration by expanding protection against
discrimination based on alienage and legal status. The federal govern-
ment should also circumscribe its role by providing states with greater
latitude to craft housing regulations and policy. Although immigrants
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Music Soundtrax 1998).
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would face uneven state housing regulations, states would eventually
clarify their housing policies under these new federal protections. De-
spite the temporary upheaval caused by such a legal regime change, it
would eventually result in an increase in immigrant housing stability and
encourage a market for immigrant labor.
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INTRODUCTION
Citing the presence of 11.9 million undocumented immigrants',
American states and municipalities have passed a number of ordinances
1 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEw HIsPANIc CTR., TRENDS IN UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRATION: UNDOCUMENTED INFLOW Now TRAILS LEGAL INFLOW i, (2008), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf. In 2008, one California court explained why it pre-
ferred the term illegal alien. In Martinez v. Regents of University of Calfornia, 83 Cal. Rptr.
3d 518, 522 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), the court explained that no authoritative source exists
that effectively explains "the term 'undocumented immigrants.' However, defendants do not
cite any authoritative definition of the term and do not support their assertion that the terms
'undocumented immigrant' and 'illegal alien' are interchangeable. We consider the term 'ille-
gal alien' less ambiguous." Id. The court's reasoning notwithstanding, the terms undocu-
mented immigrant and undocumented worker found their way into a Supreme Court decision
for the first time in 2009. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 601, 603
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targeting undocumented immigrants. Indeed, no less than 100 munici-
palities within the past five years have considered ordinances or state-
ments aimed at undocumented immigrants. 2 A typical ordinance targets
undocumented immigrants by restricting their ability to rent housing and
congregate at day laborer centers, discouraging the speaking of lan-
guages other than English, penalizing their employers for hiring them,
and eliminating their access to public benefits.3 Hazleton, Pennsylvania
passed the most infamous of these municipal ordinances, the Illegal Im-
migration Relief Act Ordinance (IIRA), in 2006.4 The IIRA prohibited
employing, harboring, and housing undocumented immigrants, and made
English the "official language" of the city.5 Many cities followed Hazle-
ton's lead and passed similar local legislation.6
(2009). The National Association of Hispanic Journalists (NAHJ) maintains an insightful po-
sition on those phrases:
[u]sing ... terms [like "illegal alien" and "illegals"] not only distorts the [immigra-
tion] debate, but it takes away [an immigrant's] identit[y] as [an] individual[] and
[as a] human being[]. When journalists do that, it's that much easier to treat them
unfairly and not give them an equal voice in the controversy.... In addition, NAHJ
has always denounced the use of the degrading terms "alien" and "illegal alien" to
describe undocumented immigrants because it casts them as adverse, strange beings,
inhuman outsiders who come to the U.S. with questionable motivations.
National Association of Hispanic Journalists, NAHJ Urges News Media to Stop Using the
Term "Illegals" when Covering Immigration (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.nahj.org/2009/09/
nahj-urges-news-media-to-stop-using-the-term-illegals-when-covering-immigration. For fur-
ther discussion, see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton (Lozano II), 620 F.3d 170, 176 n.1 (3rd
Cir. 2010). This Note will use the term undocumented immigrant, undocumented worker, or
unauthorized immigrant instead of illegal alien or illegals to describe individuals that
municpalities target in anti-immigrant housing ordinances (AIHOs).
2 See generally FAIR IMMIGRATION REFORM MOVEMENT, DATABASE OF RECENT LOCAL
ORDINANCES ON IMMIGRATION, available at www.ailadownloads.org/advo/FIRM-LocalLegis-
lationDatabase.doc [hereinafter LOCAL ORDINANCE DATABASE] (providing a comprehensive
list of AIHOs as of 2007, when much of the litigation of Hazleton-style AIHOs took place).
3 See, e.g., Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006-003 (Dec. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-GA-0001-0003.pdf [hereinafter Cherokee
County Ordinance]; Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38, available at http://clearing-
house.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0001-0002.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2010) [hereinafter
Escondido Ordinance]; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952, available at http://
www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/files/Ordinance%2ONo%202952.pdf (last visited
Aug. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Second Farmers Branch Ordinance] (citing another draft of the
same ordinance cited infra); Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (May 22, 2007), available
at http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/sites/default/files/Ordinance%2ONo%202903.pdf [here-
inafter Farmers Branch Ordinance]; Riverside, N.J., Ordinance 2006-26 (July 26, 2006), avail-
able at http://clearinghouse.wustl.edu/chDocs/public/IM-NJ-0001-0006.pdf [hereinafter
Riverside Ordinance]; Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1721 (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://
clearinghouse.wustl.edulchDocs/public/IM-MO-0001-0015.pdf.
4 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-85 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
5 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (Sept.
12, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=5472; Lozano, 496
F.Supp.2d at 484.
6 Rigel Oliveri points out the most noteworthy of these anti-immigrant ordinances. See
Rigel Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant
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In addition to Hazleton-style IIRAs, this Note examines anti-immi-
grant housing ordinances (AIHOs) that do not contain language explic-
itly targeting immigrants. Although these AIHOs do not single-out
undocumented immigrants the way IIRAs do, municipalities use housing
provisions addressing "overcrowding," "maximum occupancy," and
"family" to drive undocumented immigrants out of their communities.
Such provisions are extremely common at the local level. Unlike IIRAs,
however, these housing provisions do not, at first glance, directly impli-
cate the immigration debate. One might characterize IIRAs, for exam-
ple, as local immigration regulation ordinances, and occupancy
ordinances (usually selectively-enforced) as backdoor immigration
regulation.
Municipalities are shifting their strategies to exclude undocumented
immigrants from their communities and so too must the immigration and
public policy debate shift. Past scholarship has centered on whether anti-
immigrant ordinances (AlOs), like IIRAs, are preempted by federal im-
migration laws. There is some logic to this approach given the long-
standing precedence of De Canas v. Bica.7 With only a few exceptions,8
Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REv. 55, 60 (2009). For Oliveri those
included the ordinances in Farmers Branch, Texas, Cherokee County, Georgia, Valley Park,
Missouri, Escondido, California, and Riverside, New Jersey. Id. at 60 & n. 12; see also Chero-
kee County Ordinance, supra note 3; Escondido Ordinance, supra note 3; Second Farmers
Branch Ordinance supra note 3; Farmers Branch Ordinance, supra note 3; Riverside Ordi-
nance supra note 3; Valley Park Ordinance, supra note 3.
7 424 U.S. 351 (1976). In De Canas the Court established a three-part test to determine
whether a state or local provision was preempted by federal law as a "regulation of immigra-
tion" which the Court defined as "a determination of who should or should not be admitted
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." Villas at Park-
side Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764-65 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
(quoting De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355 and citing League of United Latin American Citizens v.
Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995)). The court in Villas at Parkside Partners
explains them:
Under the first test, the Court must determine whether a state statute is a regulation
of immigration. Since the power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclu-
sively a federal power, any state statute which regulates immigration is constitution-
ally prescribed.
Under the second test, even if the state law is not an impermissible regulation of
immigration, it may still be preempted if there is a showing that it was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress to effect a complete ouster of state power-including
state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws with respect to the
subject matter which the statute attempts to regulate. In other words, a statute is
preempted where Congress intended to occupy the field which the statute attempts to
regulate.
Under the third test, a state law is preempted if it stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Stated dif-
ferently, a statute is preempted under the third test if it conflicts with federal law
making compliance with both state and federal law impossible.
Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (citing Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 768).
8 See generally Oliveri, supra note 6 (examining anti-immigrant housing ordinances and
the weakness of preemption doctrine as a basis for challenging such ordinances effectively);
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however, no scholars have specifically considered the housing provi-
sions. The most noteworthy exception, written by Professor Rigel
Oliveri, focuses specifically on the six most litigated and highly publi-
cized ordinances-those that were specifically challenged under preemp-
tion doctrine.9 Unlike the ordinances addressed by Professor Oliveri,
occupancy ordinances that lack facially questionable language like ille-
gal alien or immigrant or citizenship render preemption analysis ineffec-
tive. Given this complicated state of ordinances, an efficacious treatment
of AIHOs must address the range of options at the disposal of states and
municipalities including (1) AlOs that explicitly target immigrants like
Hazleton's IIRA and (2) facially neutral occupancy ordinances.
Many legal scholars have attempted to resolve the debate surround-
ing AlOs. Some, like Professor Oliveri, have argued that the best way to
challenge AlOs is through a congressional expansion of the Fair Housing
Act's (FHA) suspect class protections to include alienage and legal sta-
tus, in addition to national origin.' 0 This Note argues that even if Con-
gress passed such legislation, which hardly seems likely, the legislation
would fail to protect immigrants who are prohibited from living in cer-
tain communities by selectively-enforced occupancy ordinances. Moreo-
ver, expanding protected classifications under the FHA would offer little
additional protection than the protection already afforded to legal immi-
grants. Notwithstanding the financial cost of litigating such new lan-
guage in the FHA, congressional legislation offering more protection
than courts have traditionally been willing to provide for classes might
provoke a significant backlash in the judiciary.
For this reason, this Note argues that a superior alternative to the
expansion of the FHA would take into account the role that both states
and the federal government should play in the implementation of immi-
gration policy. As Professor Cristina Rodriguez points out, subnational
governments like municipalities play a central role in the immigration
debate because they "integrate immigrants, legal and illegal alike, into
the body politic."II To offer a single federal solution to a problem with
such a diverse set of factors involved would fail to address the uneven
process that such integration would entail.
Mark S. Grube, Note, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton:
Reconciling Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391
(2010) (discussing both local housing ordinances and employment sanctions and arguing that
"courts should adopt a uniform framework for analyzing local employer sanctions and housing
laws that focuses on whether the laws conflict with or would undermine federal immigration
policy").
9 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 60 n.12.
10 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 83-86.
11 See Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571 (2008).
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Moreover, states and localities are likely to replace Hazleton-style
IIRAs with facially-neutral ordinances or unevenly enforce ordinances
already on the books. In July of 2007 when the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania permanently enjoined Hazleton from en-
forcing its IIRA, cities with similar ordinances tabled their IIRAs in an-
ticipation of the Third Circuit's decision in Lozano v. City of Hazleton.12
Now that the Third Circuit has decided Lozano and concluded that fed-
eral law preempts the Hazleton ordinance, cities are unlikely to enforce
such ordinances because enforcement means high legal fees and de-
pressed municipal economies.13 Yet cities that remain interested in con-
trolling or reducing immigrant housing access in their municipalities will
likely revert to selectively enforcing their occupancy ordinances. Since
enforcement of occupancy ordinances remains well within the realm of
traditional state powers, both federal legislation and legal challenges ad-
dressing such housing ordinances face an uphill battle. Yet, any serious
challenge to AIOs must confront the use of occupancy ordinances by city
officials to reduce or control immigrant settlement.
Part I of this Note examines the most well-known AlOs-the Ha-
zleton-style IIRAs, and the legal theories used to challenge them. This is
followed by a discussion of the less conspicuous maximum occupancy or
overcrowding ordinances, changes to definitions of family, and the few
recent successful challenges to these AIOs. Part II reviews the previous
legal theories used to challenge AIOs and their relative effectiveness.
Unlike previous scholarship, 14 this Note concludes that preemption doc-
12 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484-85 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
13 Rodrfguez, supra note 11, at 595. Professor Rodriguez presciently stated:
IRAs represent a temporary and actually quite limited outburst brought on by un-
usually high levels of unauthorized immigration and a hyperactive media during a
period of heightened national awareness of immigration. But many states and locali-
ties, when faced with the consequences of their measures-namely, high legal fees,
the disappearance of immigrant populations that had revitalized dying former indus-
trial towns, and the high administrative costs of enforcement-will start reconsider-
ing the extremity of their policies. Once the national debate has subsided
(particularly if Congress passes meaningful immigration reform in the next two
years) most local communities will revert to compromise positions of some sort,
perhaps participating in 287(g) agreements while abandoning city-led enforcement
measures such as landlord penalties.
Id.
As this Note goes to print, we await the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arizona v. United
States. In the lower court decision, United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980 (D. Ariz.
2010), the court concluded that federal law preempted much of Arizona's SB 1070 and prelim-
inarily enjoined the law. Id. at 1008. Although the substantive legal questions in that case,
like arrest, reasonable suspicion, and employment, are different from the narrow focus on
housing provisions discussed here, the Ninth Circuit's decision is important because that court
may apply De Canas v. Bica preemption analysis and reach a different conclusion with respect
to whether SB 1070 is preempted. For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.
14 See Oliveri, supra note 6.
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trine provides relatively stable ground for mounting challenges to AlOs
like Hazleton's IRA. For reasons discussed in Part II, parties challeng-
ing occupancy ordinances have been less successful because preemption
analysis does not apply. Part III offers alternative legal and public policy
approaches to dealing with immigration and housing, such as increased
protection for specific classes and decreased federal involvement in the
housing sector. The final Part presents the Note's conclusion: because
AIHOs involve both individual rights and questions of federalism, all
levels of government have a role to play.15
I. ANTI-IMMIGRANT HOUSING ORDINANCES
A. Illegal Immigration Relief Acts
Between 2006 and 2007, more than 120 municipalities and counties
passed or considered passing AIOs similar to Hazleton's IIRA. 16 Federal
courts struck down the few AIOs that activists challenged.17 The central
legal doctrine that courts apply in invalidating these ordinances is pre-
emption. Courts use three tests to determine whether a state or local
ordinance is preempted by federal law:
Under the first test, the Court must determine whether a
state statute is a regulation of immigration. Since the
power to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclu-
sively a federal power, any state statute which regulates
immigration is constitutionally prescribed.
Under the second test, even if the state law is not an
impermissible regulation of immigration, it may still be
preempted if there is a showing that it was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress to effect a complete ouster
of state power-including state power to promulgate laws
not in conflict with federal laws with respect to the sub-
ject matter which the statute attempts to regulate. In
other words, a statute is preempted where Congress in-
tended to occupy the field which the statute attempts to
regulate.
Under the third test, a state law is preempted if it stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Stated dif-
ferently, a statute is preempted under the third test if it
15 See generally Oliveri, supra note 6 (describing the interplay between the federal gov-
ernment and municipalities in dealing with housing discrimination). The federal government
could pass legislation that, inter alia, clearly delineates the spheres of authority for federal
action, and grants state and local actors authority in other areas.
16 See LOCAL ORDINANCE DATABASE, supra note 2.
17 See infra Part L.A
4052010]
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conflicts with federal law making compliance with both
state and federal law impossible.' 8
Plaintiffs have successfully argued federal preemption of AIOs in
four municipalities: Hazleton, Pennsylvania, Farmers Branch, Texas, Es-
condido, California, and Riverside, New Jersey.
1. Hazleton, PA
Hazleton's IIRA was undoubtedly the most influential because a
majority of AlOs were drafted to resemble it.19 Passed in July of 2006,
Hazleton's first version of the IIRA prohibited the employment and har-
boring of "illegal aliens." 20 A little over a month later, the city added to
the IIRA the Tenant Registration Ordinance (RO), which required te-
nants to obtain an occupancy permit.21 The RO conditioned the granting
of a permit upon the tenant's demonstration of citizenship or lawful resi-
dence.22 In pertinent part, the RO read: "Application for occupancy shall
be made upon forms furnished by the Code Enforcement Office . .. and
shall specifically require . . . [p]roper identification showing proof of
legal citizenship or residency." 23
Citing a number of grounds for its decision, the District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania struck down the RO on July 26,
2007.24 Applying preemption analysis, the court found that the RO was
in direct conflict with federal law because [it was] based
upon the assumption that: 1) the federal government
seeks the removal of all aliens who lack legal status and
2) 'a conclusive determination by the federal govern-
ment that an individual may not remain in the United
18 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (citing League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768
(C.D. Cal.1995)).
19 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 60.
20 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 484 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
21 Id.
22 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 484.
23 Hazelton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 § 7(b)(1) Establishing a Registration Program for
Residential Rental Properties (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/de-
tail.phpid=5472. Like other municipal occupancy ordinances, the Hazleton ordinance, as
amended, makes reference to Hazleton's International Property Maintenance Code provisions
regarding maximum occupancy. 2006-13 § 3(c) ("No Dwelling Unit shall be occupied, know-
ingly by the Owner or Agent, by a number of persons that is in excess of the requirements
outlined in 2003 International Property Maintenance Code, Chapter 4, Light, Ventilation, and
Occupancy Limits. SectionPM-404.5, Overcrowding, or any update thereof, a copy of which
is appended hereto and made a part hereof.").
24 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 477; see also Oliveri, supra note 6, at 60.
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States can somehow be obtained outside of a formal re-
moval hearing.' 2 5
The court pointed out that documents proving citizenship or resi-
dency might be unattainable by aliens who were waiting for clarification
of their status by the federal government.2 6 Thus, such persons, although
permitted to reside in the United States and to seek employment, would
be denied housing in Hazleton. 2 7
After Hazleton appealed the decision, the Third Circuit upheld the
lower court. 2 8 In its opinion's preemption analysis, the Third Circuit
specifically took issue with the housing provisions because the housing
provisions, unlike the employment provisions, regulated the ability of
individuals to enter "private contract for shelter." 29 Although preemp-
25 Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530 (quoting plaintiffs brief). I will expand my discus-
sion of the court's legal standard for determining if the ordinance is preempted later within this
Note. In brief, the Court asks: where either (1) the local ordinance "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" or (2) it is
not possible to comply with both the federal and state law. See id. (quoting Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
26 See Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31.
27 See id. at 531. The court goes to great lengths to emphasize that a person illegally
residing in the United States has many alternative routes in order to obtain relief from removal
and requiring them to prove citizenship or residency would be a violation of Due Process. See
id. at 532. For example, many unauthorized immigrants could request to stay in the United
States based upon the person's relationship with a spouse or close relative. See id. Some may
seek to stay as victims of domestic violence or torture. See id. If all else fails, the person
could seek permission of residency from the Attorney General. See id. The court also empha-
sizes that the RO calls upon clerks in the Hazleton Code Enforcement Office to determine
whether someone is "properly in the country." Id. at 533.
28 Lozano v. City of Hazleton (Lozano II), 620 F.3d 170, 224 (3rd Cir. 2010).
29 Id. The court specifically attempted to distinguish the housing provisions and the
employment provisions by noting that restrictions on employment fall squarely within state
police powers. Id. The court went to great lengths to point this out by citing the most recent
Farmers Branch decision (Farmers Branch III) for the proposition that "[l]ocal regulation that
conditions the ability to enter private contract for shelter on federal immigration status is of a
fundamentally different nature than . . . restrictions on employment." Id. (quoting Villas at
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 855-56 (N.D. Tex. 2010)).
Despite the effort to distinguish the employment and housing provisions, the court's distinc-
tion remains unclear. Yet, the court attempted further clarification by noting the distinction
drawn by the parties:
The parties characterize the housing provisions of the RO and the IIRAO in starkly
different terms. Hazleton maintains that the housing provisions regulate rental ac-
commodations, and thus, like the employment provisions, fall within the state's his-
toric police powers. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that these provisions
regulate who may live in Hazleton based on immigration status, and that regulating
which aliens are permitted to reside in the United States is a historically federal
function far beyond the police powers of any state.
Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220. Siding with the plaintiffs, the court seemed to indirectly endorse
the plaintiffs' theory with respect to why federal immigration law preempts the housing provi-
sions. Id. Namely, when a state or local government decides to regulate who will be renting in
within its jurisdiction, and the who question is based on immigration status, a court will likely
perform a more searching inquiry and, ultimately, side with the party attacking the provision.
2010] 407
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tion analysis requires that a court presume non-preemption, the court re-
jected this presumption because Hazleton, through its housing
provisions, had "[d]ecid[ed] which aliens may live in the United States,"
and such a decision "has always been the prerogative of the federal
government."30
Applying each form of preemption analysis, the court concluded
that the housing provision of the Hazleton ordinance was an unquestiona-
bly impermissible regulation of immigration.31 Applying field preemp-
tion analysis, the court specifically cited the Immigration and Nationality
Act's (INA) "comprehensiveness" as "plainly excluding" state efforts. 32
The court also rejected Hazleton's argument that it merely enforces fed-
eral provisions-like anti-harboring laws-concurrently with the federal
government. 33 Concurrent enforcement, for the court, was simply field
preempted, and even if it was not, federal anti-harboring provisions have
"never been interpreted to apply so broadly as to encompass the typical
landlord/tenant relationship [as would be the case under the Hazleton
ordinance]."34 The court also concluded that the housing provision was
conflict preempted because it was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the
In this respect the court's analysis is not altogether different from traditional equal protection
analysis. See, e.g., id. ("[W]e cannot bury our heads in the sand ostrich-like ignoring the
reality of what these ordinances accomplish. Through its housing provisions, Hazleton at-
tempts to regulate residence based solely on immigration status.").
30 Lozano 11, 620 F.3d at 220.
31 Id. The court summarily concluded that Hazleton was in violation of the first prong of
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), by stating that "it is clear that [Hazleton] has at-
tempted to usurp authority that the Constitution has placed beyond the vicissitudes of local
governments." Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 220.
32 Id. The court recognized that Hazleton might draw a distinction between (1) forbid-
ding people from renting and (2) excluding or physically expelling individuals from a commu-
nity. Id. at 221. Hazleton would clearly argue its provision was merely performing the former
in exercising its power to restrict certain people from renting. Yet, the court summarily re-
jected the distinction because, as the court concluded, despite its claims to the former, the city
was clearly attempting to do the latter. Id.
At oral argument, Hazleton also sought to further narrow the argument that it restricted
unauthorized immigrants from living in its community by pointing out that unauthorized immi-
grants could still reside in the community if they stayed with friends or purchased homes in
Hazleton. Id. The court, again, summarily rejected this argument as well by pointing out that
individuals affected by the provisions could not avail themselves of these alternatives and,
even if they could, other provisions of the ordinance would ensure their exclusion from Hazle-
ton. Id.
33 Id. at 218-19.
34 Id. at 223 ("We ... define 'harboring' as conduct 'tending to substantially facilitate an
alien's remaining in the United States illegally and to prevent government authorities from
detecting the alien's unlawful presence.' Thus, we have held that 'harboring' requires some
act of obstruction that reduces the likelihood the government will discover the alien's pres-
ence. It is highly unlikely that a landlord's renting of an apartment to an alien lacking lawful
immigration status could ever, without more, satisfy this definition of harboring. Renting an
apartment in the normal course of business is not in and of itself conduct that prevents the
government from detecting an alien's presence." (internal citations omitted)). The court noted
that it is not aware of a single case in which someone was convicted of harboring for merely
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INA for a city to remove persons based on a "snapshot" of their immi-
gration status rather than by a federal removal order.35 Moreover, an
unlawful immigration status, in most instances, does not lead to removal
without a hearing pursuant to INA § 240.36 The court added that because
the government has complete discretion as to when to initiate such a
hearing, it is impossible to predict when the government will initiate such
a hearing, and the outcome once the government initiates it.37 In short,
unauthorized immigrants are not always removed after a hearing is initi-
ated against them, and a judge can, if she chooses, adjust the status of the
immigrant from unauthorized to permanent resident.38
The Third Circuit also addressed the larger ramifications of a deci-
sion that would conclude that anti-immigrant provisions were not pre-
empted. In particular, the court noted that, despite the Hazleton
ordinance's narrow geographical application to the city itself, a conclu-
sion of non-preemption could extend Hazleton-like AlOs across the na-
tion and ultimately "eviscerate" the federal government's regulation of
immigration. 3 9
2. Farmers Branch, TX
On June 19, 2007, the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, enjoined an ordinance, with similar provisions to Hazleton's, in
Farmers Branch, Texas. 4 0 Farmers Branch's Ordinance 2903 required all
tenants in a given household to show landlords proof of their citizenship
renting an apartment to someone not legally in the United States, and it distinguished all of the
cases cited by Hazleton as involving more than mere renting. Id. at 223-24.
35 Id. at 221. The court also dismissed Hazleton's efforts to ensure that its housing pro-
vision complied with current immigration laws. Id. Although not explicit in its explanation,
the court appears to argue, like other courts applying preemption analysis in the immigration
context, that federal immigration statutes are not the end of the inquiry with respect to a per-
son's immigration status, and therefore any attempt to comply with the statutes would be
futile. See id. (citing Justice Blackmun as stating that "'the structure of the immigration stat-
utes makes it impossible for the State to determine which aliens are entitled to residence, and
which eventually will be deported.'" Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 236 (Black-
mun, J., concurring)). In short, only the federal government can effectively determine a per-
son's immigration status. Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 224.
36 Lozano II, 620 F.3d at 221.
37 Id. at 222.
38 Id. The Third Circuit also noted that the ordinance is specifically in conflict with
statutes that provide unauthorized immigrants access to relief in very specific situations like
battered women and children. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)).
39 Id. at 221. The court stated: "Again, it is not only Hazleton's ordinance that we must
consider. If Hazleton can regulate as it has here, then so could every other state or locality."
Id. (citing Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 373 (2008)).
40 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 777 (N.D.
Tex. 2007). The "anti-illegal immigrant" ordinance was introduced by a Farmers Branch city
councilman who stated that he "saw . . . property values declining . .. less desirable people
mov[ing] into our neighborhoods, people who don't value education, [and] people who don't
value taking care of their properties." See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 80.
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or immigration status. 4 1 Unlike the Hazelton ordinance, the language of
Ordinance 2903 also makes clear that it should not be interpreted as
"promulgat[ing] new and additional [i]mmigration [l]aws or . . . con-
flict[ing] in any manner with . . . [f]ederal .. . [i]mmigration [1]aws." 4 2
The district court failed to reach the implied preemption challenges
of field and conflict preemption in determining whether to enjoin the
Farmers Branch ordinance. 43 The court focused instead on Ordinance
2903's usage of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's
(HUD) provisions regarding "eligible immigration status."44 Noting that
"eligible immigration status" merely "define[s] which noncitizens are eli-
gible for federal housing subsidies," the court concluded that Ordinance
2903 prohibited landlords from providing housing to tenants who would
be ineligible for federal housing subsidies under HUD provisions regard-
less of their legal status. 45 As the court emphasized, a number of nonci-
tizens like workers, diplomats, and students, may be legally present in
the United States and not qualify for federal housing subsidies. 46 Thus,
in barring such legally present residents from residing in Farmers
Branch, the ordinance "affect[ed] the 'conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain"' and constituted a regulation of immigration. 47
Moreover, landlords, who are unqualified and unauthorized to determine
immigration status, would bear the responsibility of determining a ten-
ant's legal presence based upon inappropriate HUD regulations and es-
41 Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62. The Farmers Branch ordi-
nance and the Hazleton ordinance because the Farmers Branch ordinance required that the
tenants provide the landlords the evidence and not a government agency. Id. at 762. Evidence
of citizenship or legal status included "the documents which must be submitted to evidence
citizenship or eligible immigration status for residency in the United States." Id. at 762. Al-
though it is not entirely clear from the ordinance, the language seems to suggest that the
landlord is responsible for determining whether the evidence is sufficient. See Oliveri, supra
note 6, at 64.
42 Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 762-63. A person violating the ordi-
nance "shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in
a sum not to exceed $500 and a separate offense shall be deemed committed upon each day
during or on which a violation occurs or continues." Id. at 763 (internal quotations omitted).
43 See id. at 777; Oliveri, supra note 6, at 67.
44 See Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 769 (internal quotations omitted);
see also Oliveri, supra note 6, at 67-68. The City sent area apartment complexes a letter
identifying the forms required to complete the verification form and comply with the ordi-
nance. See Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 768-69. All of the sample forms
included in the letter, that landlords and tenants could use to verify legal status, were HUD
forms. Id.
45 See id. at 768; Oliveri, supra note 6, at 67.
46 See Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 768; Oliveri, supra note 6, at
67-68.
47 Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351, 355 (1976)); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 67-68.
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tablish a de facto set of standards. 4 8 Accordingly, the court found that
the ordinance was a violation of the first De Canas test because it, effec-
tively, regulated immigration. 4 9
Farmers Branch attempted to grapple with the problems of Ordi-
nance 2903 by enacting Ordinance 2952 in January of 2008.50 Like Or-
dinance 2903, Ordinance 2952 maintained a residential occupancy
licensing scheme, but Farmers Branch removed the HUD-related regula-
tions. 51 Instead, city building inspectors were required to "verify with
the federal government whether the occupant is an alien lawfully present
in the United States."5 2 The city contended that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373(c), the federal government must provide the city with a report
indicating the immigrant's status.5 3
On March 24, 2010, the district court permanently enjoined Ordi-
nance 2952 and concluded that federal law preempted it.54 Like Lozano
II, the court refused to apply the presumption against preemption because
the Ordinance regulated "an 'area where there has been a history of sig-
nificant federal power.' "5 5 Applying preemption analysis, the court con-
cluded that the ordinance was an impermissible regulation of
immigration for multiple reasons. First, federal law preempted the ordi-
nance because it placed another burden on "aliens" that was not author-
ized by Congress. 56  Secondly, the court rejected Farmers Branch's
attempt to use reports from the federal government as the basis for mak-
ing a determination of immigrant status because § 1373 was an "inappli-
cable federal standard" for making such a decision, and because
Congress never authorized an extension of federal immigration classifi-
cations with the provision.57 Similarly, the court also concluded that the
48 Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 772; Oliveri, supra note 6, at 68. The
district court found significant similarities between the duties that landlords in Farmers Branch
would have to carry forth and the duties state agents in De Canas would have to carry forth.
Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 772. The district court in Farmers Branch
ultimately found that Ordinance 2903 was in violation of the first De Canas test. Id. at 772.
49 Id. at 772.
50 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch II), 701 F.
Supp. 2d 835, 840 (2010).
51 Id. at 840.
52 Id. at 842 (citing Ordinance 2952 § D(1)). The court went on to note that the "Ordi-
nance does not specify the method by which the City is to verify an applicant's status with the
federal government and instead conditions the City's enforcement upon receipt of a report
from the federal government that the 'occupant is an alien not lawfully present in the United
States."' Id.
53 Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) which sets out the federal government's obligation to
respond to inquiries on the citizenship or immigration status of an individual).
54 Id. at 861.
55 Id. at 852 (citing U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000)).
56 Villas at Parkside Partners, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 855 (citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1,
12 (1982)).
57 Id. at 856.
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ordinance was impliedly preempted under both field and conflict pre-
emption grounds because Farmers Branch used federal immigration clas-
sifications for purposes not contemplated by Congress.58
3. Escondido, CA
The city of Escondido, California passed an AIO on October 18,
2006 that targeted housing with harboring provisions. 59 Ordinance 2006-
38R penalized any owner of a dwelling unit who "harbors an illegal alien
in the dwelling unit, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an
alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of
law." 60 Applying field preemption analysis, the court found that federal
immigration law would not likely preempt the ordinance.c6 The "harbor-
ing" language was strikingly similar to 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which provides
for penalties if a person "conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or
attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any
place, including any building." 62
Unlike its conclusions with respect to field preemption, the court
concluded that an application of conflict preemption would render the
ordinance federally preempted because "it could stand as a burden or
obstacle to federal law." 6 3 The City intended to use the "federal govern-
ment's Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program"
to determine whether the tenants were "illegal aliens." 64 The court rea-
soned, however, that the SAVE program was not designed for making
such determinations in private landlord-tenant relationships. 65 Moreo-
ver, the federal regulations clearly mandate that "the responsibility of
determining an individual's alienage status [would fall] on the local or
state entities themselves." 66 Cities using such resources in order to deter-
58 Id. at 859.
59 Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1047-48 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
60 Id. at 1047-48.
61 Id. at 1055-56. The court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the
enforcement of the ordinance. Id. at 1060. The court's TRO analysis considered the "likeli-
hood of success on the merits," the "possibility of irreparable harm," and the "balance of
hardships." Id. at 1049. This required the court to consider issues going to the merits, like
federal preemption of the ordinance. Id. at 1055-57; see also Kristina M. Campbell, Local
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinances: A Legal, Policy, and Litigation Analysis, 84 DENV.
U. L. REv. 1041, 1056-57 (2007) (arguing preemption of Illegal Immigration Relief Acts like
the one in Hazleton and citing specific provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to
support her argument).
62 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009); Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at
1056.
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mine legal status in a formal hearing would unquestionably burden De-
partment of Justice and Homeland Security resources. 6 7
4. Riverside, NJ
In late July of 2006, the New Jersey Township of Riverside adopted
the first of three versions of its AIHOs. 6 8 The first, Ordinance 2006-16,
banned "renting to illegal aliens," and stated that "any property owner or
renter/tenant/lessee in control of property, who knowingly allows an ille-
gal alien to use, rent or lease their property" would be violating the
AIHO. 6 9 On October 18, 2006, multiple immigrant rights groups
brought suit, alleging that Ordinance 2006-16 was unconstitutionally
vague, unfairly put businesses at risk, and violated civil rights under state
law.70 On October 25, 2006, Riverside revised its ordinance to make it
illegal to knowingly or recklessly harbor an "illegal alien." 7' Citing the
district court decision in Lozano v. Hazleton and the substantial cost of
litigation, however, the town council voted to repeal the ordinance. 7 2
67 Id. The court also concluded that the Ordinance would violate due process because it
would fail to provide landlords with any recourse with respect to the deprivation of their
property, and the ordinance would also implicate their liberty interest because of the possibility
of jail time. Id. at 1057-59. The court further concluded that the ordinance violated a tenant's
due process rights because it "fail[ed] to provide for notice or hearing of any kind prior to the
deprivation of an illegal alien's tenancy interest." Id. at 1058-59. On December 14, 2006, the
court approved a settlement between the two sides in which the Escondido City Council agreed
to a permanent injunction and payment of plaintiff attorney fees. See Campbell, supra note 61,
at 1057.
68 James Katz, Verified Complaint at 4, Riverside Coal. Bus. Pers. Landlords v. Twp. of
Riverside (Oct. 18, 2006), available at http://www.aclu-nj.org/downloads/RiversideComplaint.
pdf.
69 Township of Riverside, N.J., Illegal Immigration Relief Act, Ordinance 2006-16
§ 5(B) (July 26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/riversidefirst
ordinance.pdf.
70 Businesses Sue Riverside, NJ over Vague, Discriminatory Anti-immigrant Ordinance,
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 18, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/busi-
nesses-sue-riverside-nj-over-vague-discriminatory-anti-immigrant-ordinance.
71 Riverside, N.J., An Ordinance Amending Chapter 166, Referred to as the "Illegal Im-
migration Relief Act," Ordinance 2006-26, § 166-5 (July 26, 2006), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/riverside-firstordinance.pdf; Campbell, supra note 61, at
1058.
72 ACLU Applauds Repeal of Anti-Immigrant Ordinance in Riverside, NJ, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-applauds-re-
peal-anti-immigrant-ordinance-riverside-nj; see also Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Re-
think Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/09/26/nyregion/26riverside.html ("With the departure of so many people, the local econ-
omy suffered. . . . Meanwhile, the town was hit with two lawsuits challenging the law. Legal
bills began to pile up, straining the town's already tight budget. Suddenly, many people -
including some who originally favored the law - started having second thoughts."). In Sep-
tember of 2007 when the city council repealed the ordinance, Mayor George Conrad noted that
the township failed to anticipate the "economic burden" of the original ordinance. See Belson
& Capuzzo, supra. Indeed, after the ordinance was passed, immigrants left and the town
became a "ghost town." See id.
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B. Occupancy, Overcrowding, and Family
AIHOs, however, are not limited to the AlOs that cropped up in
2006 and specifically targeted immigrants. Indeed, those ordinances rep-
resented only the most direct form of anti-immigrant laws. States and
municipalities have long targeted immigrants in a variety of other
ways. 73 Municipalities in particular have availed themselves of their
powers pursuant to their respective property maintenance codes and have
in some cases responded much more broadly than state governments. 74
Occupancy ordinances, in fact, represent the greatest challenge to con-
testing AIHOs because courts are deferential in their treatment of such
ordinances.75 Those ordinances have also been reasonably effective be-
cause studies have shown that immigrant families, and Latino immigrant
families in particular, tend to maintain numerically larger households
than the average American family.76 This factor, along with many immi-
grant households being composed exclusively of male laborers, contrib-
utes to some immigrant households violating occupancy ordinances.77
73 In Georgia, for example, Governor Sonny Perdue signed the Georgia Security and
Immigration Compliance Act (SB529),the state's most pervasive anti-immigrant legislation, in
April of 2006. Stephanie A. Bohon, Georgia's Response to New Immigration, in IMMIGRA-
TION's NEW FRONTIERS, 67 (Greg Anrig, Jr. & Tova Andrea Wang eds., 2006). The bill
targeted undocumented immigrants in the areas of employment, law enforcement, tax with-
holding, education, health care, and even emergency assistance. Id. Yet SB529, as legislation
targeting unauthorized immigration, fails in comparison to the other bills proposed in the
Georgia General Assembly that failed to gain approval. Id. at 75. The failed bills contained,
among other things, provisions requiring immigrants to provide proof of citizenship, register to
vote and apply for any public assistance, provide valid proof of legal residency for employ-
ment, attend public schools, and obtain valid driver's licenses. See id.
74 See Bohon, supra note 73, at 78-79 (discussing response at Georgia local level to
perceived unauthorized immigration). Cities in Georgia have diverged in their respective ap-
proaches to enforcement. Id. at 78. Some have limited their efforts to "English only" sign
ordinances and the enforcement of old loitering statutes to target day laborers. Id. In Meck-
lenburg County, North Carolina, the state began a program in which Immigration and Customs
Officials (ICE) will train Mecklenburg County deputies to screen for immigration violations.
See McClain, supra note 73; see also Mark A. Grey, State and Local Immigration Policy in
Iowa, in IMMIGRATION's NEw FRONTIERS 44-64 (Greg Anrig, Jr. & Tova Andrea Wang eds.,
2006) (describing measures taken at the state level in Iowa both positively and negatively
affecting immigrant rights in the areas of language, housing, health care, education, identifica-
tion, and law enforcement).
75 See generally City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 738 (1995) (de-
clining to view the city ordinance's description of "family" as a maximum occupancy
restriction).
76 Even a cursory glance at the statistics demonstrates the significantly higher household
size of Hispanic origin families. See, e.g., Average Household Size by Race/Ethnicity, DIVERS-
ITYDATA.ORG, http://diversitydata-archive.org/Data/Rankings/Show.aspx?ind=88 (last visited
Nov. 5, 2010).
77 Statistics support the greater rate of overcrowding in Hispanic households which we
can infer would likely extend to Hispanic immigrant households. See, e.g., Overcrowding
Rate by Race/Ethnicity, DIVERSITYDATA.ORG, http://diversitydata-archive.org/Data/Rankings/
Show.aspx?ind=92 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
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More recently, with the encouragement of anti-immigrant activists,
a number of municipalities, primarily in the South, have targeted immi-
grants by passing maximum occupancy ordinances or by enforcing pre-
existing occupancy ordinances. No less than nine cities have passed
maximum occupancy ordinances.78 Others have attempted to circumvent
the more straightforward language of the Hazleton-style ordinance and
maximum occupancy ordinances. 79
1. Virginia
In Virginia, municipalities and counties have experimented with a
variety of legal measures in order to manage their perceived unautho-
rized immigrant and overcrowding problems. The City of Manassas,
Virginia, for example, implemented a Residential Overcrowding Code
Enforcement Program (ROCEP) in 2004 complete with a telephone and
email hotline for anonymous complaints.80 As of December of 2005 the
city found few overcrowding violations81 and decided to amend the defi-
nition of "family" in its housing ordinance by confining the meaning of
family to "immediate relatives" and excluding extended family. 82 The
controversial definition remained in place until early 2006 when it was
again abandoned by the city.83 During the law's short duration, as few as
twenty-three home inspections-all Hispanic households-took place. 84
As Isabelle M. Thabault, the Director of the Fair Housing Project at the
Washington Lawyers' Committee pointed out, "When Manassas changed
78 See LOCAL ORDINANCE DATABASE, supra note 2 (citing maximum occupancy ordi-
nances in the Alabama towns of Hoover, Pelham, Northport and Gaston County, North Caro-
lina); PRLDEF LIST OF LOCAL ORDINANCES, www.ailadownloads.org/advo/PRLDEF-
ListOfLocalOrdinances.xls, (citing the towns listed above and also Defuniak Springs, Florida,
Cobb County, Georgia, Gonzales, Louisiana, and Spotsylvania, Virginia).
79 In Barnstable Town, Massachusetts, for example, the city passed an ordinance in 2006
that required landlords to note the occupants within their properties. See LOCAL ORDINANCE
DATABASE, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that the list should be made available to "health officials
and police"). Bridgeport, Pennsylvania not only passed a Hazleton-style ordinance, it also
required landlords to register their housing units. See id. at 11 (the city also barred the em-
ployment of undocumented workers, and declared English the town's only language).
80 See News Release, City of Manassas, Virginia, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.manassas-
city.org/DocumentView.aspx?DID=2358 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter MANASSAS
NEWS RELEASE]; Civil Rights Lawsuit Filed Against the City of Manassas, VA and its School
System for Discriminating Against Hispanic Residents, THE EQUAL RIGHTS CTR. (Oct. 16,
2007), http://www.equalrightscenter.org/site/PageServer?pagename=p r_071016 [hereinaf-
ter EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER ACCOUNT].
81 Id.
82 Activists Prepare to Challenge Va. Zoning Ordinance, WTOPNEWS.COM, (Jan. 1,
2006, 10:47 AM) http://www.wtopnews.com/index.phpnid=25&sid=662594; EQUAL RIGHTS
CENTER AccoUNT, supra note 80. The family definition was one that Manassas had previ-
ously adopted in 1991, but shortly thereafter abandoned because the definition was possibly
unconstitutional. See EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER ACCOUNT, supra note 80.
83 EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER ACCOUNT, supra note 80.
84 Id.
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the definition of "family" to exclude extended families from living to-
gether, it essentially made a common Hispanic family structure ille-
gal."85 On October 16, 2007, Washington, D.C.'s Equal Rights Center
filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia alleging that, since 2005, approximately 92% percent of homes
investigated under ROCEP were Hispanic-owned or occupied. 86 In Sep-
tember of 2008 the two sides settled out of court. 7 Pursuant to the set-
tlement, Manassas agreed to eliminate its "overcrowding hotline, create a
new overcrowding inspection procedure, and hire a housing manager to
administer existing housing programs and address concerns by residents
who claim they have been unfairly targeted."88
Like Manassas, numerous other cities in Virginia tinkered with their
overcrowding ordinances. The City of Herndon, for example, stepped up
enforcement of its overcrowding ordinances8 9 and narrowed municipal
definitions of family to include only immediate relatives-even if the
total household, including extended relatives, failed to exceed occupancy
85 Id. Manassas residents felt so threatened by the influx of undocumented immigrants
that in early 2007 they formed "Help Save Manassas" (HSM) to "reduce the number of illegal
aliens living in [the] community." See AUDREY SINGER, JILL H. WILSON, & BROOKE DEREN-
ZIS, IMMIGRANTS, PoLrIcs, AND LOCAL RESPONSE IN SUBURBAN WASHINGTON, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION 15 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/reports/
2009/0225_immigration-singer/0225_immigration-singer.pdf [hereinafter IMMIGRANTS,
POLITICS, AND LOCAL RESPONSE]. HSM grew quickly in 2007 from forty members to more
than 1,500 by the fall of 2007. Id. In late 2007 the Ku Klux Klan, to the condemnation of
officials and activists on both sides, made an anti-immigrant appeal to some of the 'white,
Christian' residents of Manassas. See id. at 15 n.35; see also Pamela Constable, Klan Leaflets
Denounced in Manassas, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/05/AR2007090502272.html.
86 See EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER AccoUNT, supra note 80. Latinos make up only 15% of
the Manassas population. Id. The complaint also alleged that the city used intimidation tactics
and nighttime inspections solely against Hispanic residents. Id. The Equal Rights Center sued
the Manassas school system, in addition to the city, alleging that the school system was work-
ing with the city by providing the names of fifty-two Hispanic students to city inspectors in
order to determine which houses to target. See Jennifer Buske, Suit Claiming Bias Against
Hispanics is Settled, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2008/09/24/AR2008092400088.html.
87 EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER AccouNT, supra note 80; Manassas News Release, supra note
80.
88 See Buske supra note 86, Manassas News Release, supra note 87. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice investigated the city based on the complaints brought against the school system
and city and agreed to discontinue investigating the city after the settlement. See Buske, supra
note 86.
89 Proposed Amendments to Chapter 1410 of the Codified Ordinances of Loudoun Cnty
to Adopt Those Sections of the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code Dealing with the
Enforcement of Occupancy Limitations in Existing Dwelling Units, Before the Loudon Cnty
Bd. of Supervisors 3 (July 13, 2004), available at http://www.loudoun.gov/controls/speerio/
resources/RenderContent.aspx?data=4c 1077660e5d4e05a7ebd22bff455d35&tabid=313&
fmpath=%2FBoard+Standing+Committees%2FFinance-Govt.+Services+Committee%2F2004
%2F07-26-04+JT.+MEETING [hereinafter Loudon County Hearing].
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restrictions. 90 Nearby Loudon County sought Herndon's assistance in
amending its municipal code to include Herndon's overcrowding ordi-
nances. 91 In November 2007, Loudon County's Board of Supervisors
released a study of occupancy and overcrowding complaints for the
county and made recommendations. 9 2 The Loudon County Board found
that the county's zoning enforcement team responded to more than 1,000
complaints during the 2007 fiscal year .93 Partly in response to these
complaints, zoning enforcement staff conducted more than 7,246 resi-
dential inspections. 94 Overcrowding complaints for the same period to-
taled more than 200.95 Loudon County amended its overcrowding and
family ordinance provisions to limit the number of unrelated adults living
together by restricting the number of people permitted to live in a single-
family dwelling unit to four,9 6 and requiring fifty feet or more per person
per bedroom.97 In fiscal year 2008, residents filed 178 overcrowding
complaints. 9 8 Of the complaints, roughly 80% did not result in a single
90 Stephanie McCrummen, Manassas Ordinance Raises Cries of Bigotry, WASH. POST,
Jan. 1, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/31/AR200512
3101069.html?referrer-emailarticle. In addition to its housing ordinances, Herndon proposed
a series of measures in August 2008 targeting day laborers including confiscation of bicycles
chained to signs and trees, assigning a police officer and zoning inspector to the known day
laborer area, creating a room rental permit program, creating a pedestrian "safe" zone prohibit-
ing standing along a known strip where day laborers are known to congregate, revoking the
ability of nearby convenience stores to serve alcohol, and removing pay phones in the area.
See Giving the Cold Shoulder to Laborers, FAIRFAX CouNTY TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, http://
www.fairfaxtimes.com/cms/archivestory.php?id=234746.
91 See Loudon County Hearing, supra note 89, at 2-3. The zoning code that was
adopted by both Herndon and Loudon is generally based on the International Property Mainte-
nance Code. The specific family definition and enforcement frequency are local variations.
Hemdon informed Loudon County that enforcement of overcrowding ordinances could be
quite time-consuming taking upwards of eight months. See id. at 3.
The relationship between the City of Herndon and Loudon County stems from the prox-
imity of the locations to one another. See Sandhya Somashekhar, Loudoun Approves Measure
Targeting Illegal Immigrants, WASH. PosT, July 18, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/17/AR2007071700797.html. In fact, a day labor center in
Herndon abuts the border of Loudon County. Id.
92 See Illegal Immigration Issues, Board of Supervisors, Comm. of the Whole, Action
Item 1, Nov. 29, 2007, available at http://www.loudoun.gov/controls/speerio/resources/Render
Content.aspx?data=b348209e0cb2456586a189158fl57fb4&tabid=3 13&fmpath=%2FSpecial+
Meetings%2F2007%2F1 1-29-07+Committee+of+the+Whole-+Immigration+Issue [hereinafter
Loudon County Immigration Issues].




97 See id. Neither basements nor recreation rooms count as sleeping areas unless they
meet other requirements of the Maintenance Code. See id.
98 See Loudon County Immigration Issues, supra note 92.
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violation of the zoning ordinance pursuant to either the new family defi-
nition or the new overcrowding provisions. 99
In contrast to neighboring counties, Prince William County's
crowding ordinances are less stringent.100 The county's definition of
family permits numerous nuclear families related to each other to live
together with no more than two unrelated co-habitants.101 Like its
neighbors, however, Prince William County took similar actions to stifle
the county's perceived threat of undocumented immigrant overcrowd-
ing. 102 Citing multiple vehicles and obvious co-habitation of multiple
unrelated people, 03 native-born homeowners began reporting alleged
overcrowding violations to the County's Property Code Enforcement
(PCE) Group.104 Overcrowding complaints increased from 128 in 2004
to 460 in 2007-a surge of more than 350%.1o5 Complaints to PCE
climbed, in general, from 2,271 in 2004 to 3,977 in 2007 and over-
whelmed PCE.106 PCE found fifty-seven occupancy violations in
2007-fifty-two more than they found in 2004.107
99 See id. Loudon County also contacted neighboring counties to determine what efforts
they were undertaking to manage residential overcrowding. See id. The county learned that in
2007 Fairfax County added a multi-agency "strike force" to investigate overcrowding com-
plaints. See id. Neighboring Henrico County also increased enforcement by creating the "Di-
vision of Community Maintenance" charged with zoning ordinance and property maintenance
enforcement. See id.
100 See IMMIGRANTS, POLITICS, AND LOCAL RESPONSE, supra note 85, at 14 n. 30.
101 Id. Some of the native-born residents found the definition of family to be too lenient.
Id.
102 See IMMIGRANTS, POLITICS, AND LOCAL RESPONSE, supra note 85, at 12. Residents in
Prince William County responded to the growing Latino population as changing the "feel" of
many of the county's neighborhoods. Id. The native-born residents pointed to "more Spanish
being spoken, less personal interaction among neighbors, [anlincrease in outdoor activities and
noise levels, and in some cases, a rise in street crime." Id. at 14.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 14.
105 Id.
106 IMMIGRANTs, POLITICS, AND LOCAL RESPONSE, supra note 85. In order for a county
official to investigate an overcrowding complaint by entering a home, the county official needs
evidence indicating that co-habitants are not related. Id.
107 Id. Like other communities proposing anti-immigrant legislation, Prince William
County's Board of County Supervisors, often working with members of HSM in Manassas,
passed a number of resolutions targeting immigrants. Id. at 15-17. In July of 2007, the Board
voted unanimously for Resolution 07-609, ordering police to inquire into a person's legal
status if the person is detained for violating a state law or county ordinance, and if the police
officer has probable cause to believe the person is unlawfully present in the United States. Id.
at 16, 17; cf. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 988 (2010) (concluding that
federal law would preempt ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010) that "require[ed] that an
officer make a reasonable attempt to determine the immigration status of a person stopped,
detained or arrested if there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully present in
the United States, and requiring verification of the immigration status of any person arrested
prior to releasing that person").
Local activists in Prince William County were incapable of organizing enough support to
counter the HSM-backed resolution. Id. at 17. One resident in September 2007, however,
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2. Georgia
Like Virginia, Georgia counties and municipalities experimented
with occupancy ordinances and other traditional property maintenance
code powers to restrict the so-called problem of camas calientes."10 8
Camas calientes refers to overcrowded living quarters in which people
use beds in shifts.109
In Gwinnett County, for example, housing officials increased their
enforcement of existing occupancy limits in response to a surge in resi-
dential overcrowding complaints."i 0 One zoning enforcement inspector
from the city of Duluth stated that approximately ninety-eight percent of
erected a twelve-by-forty foot sign in Manassas that stated "Prince William County stop your
racism to Hispanics." Id. A number of people opposing the resolution demonstrated at the
sign. IMMIGRANTS, POLITICS, AND LOCAL RESPONSE, supra note 85, at 17. The sign survived a
failed Molotov cocktail attack, but unknown figures eventually ripped it in half. Id. at 17;
Nick Miroff, Raw Look at Immigration Crucible, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 2007, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ll/02/AR2007110202158.html?sid=ST2007
110202179. Some filmmakers, using the sign and its address, ironically 9500 Liberty, pro-
duced a documentary on the immigration debate in Prince William County. See Kevin R.
Johnson, 9500 Liberty: Prince William County, VA, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (May 20, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2009/05/9500-liberty-prince-william-county-
va.html. On October 16, 2007, the Board further expanded its efforts at eliminating unautho-
rized immigrants from the community by passing Resolution 07-894. IMMIGRANTS, PoLIrcs,
AND LOCAL RESPONSE, supra note 85, at 17. The resolution created, inter alia, a Criminal
Alien Unit within the police department, and directed staff to implement policies consistent
with current state and federal law to prevent business licenses from being issued to illegal
immigrants. Id. Despite staggering costs, the resolution remained in place and the Board only
slightly modified the resolution in April 2008 to eliminate the probable cause language, which
incurred racial profiling suspicions, and directed police to check the legal status only after the
person has been arrested. Id. at 16, 18; cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2010) ("For any
lawful stop, detention or arrest made by a law enforcement official . . . where reasonable
suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a
reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the
person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation.").
108 Bohon, supra note 73, at 80-81. Some municipalities and counties, at least initially,
began restricting occupancy in dwellings by using anachronistic bordello laws. Id. at 78.
109 Id. at 80-81; see also Jorge H. Atiles & Stephanie A. Bohon, Camas Calientes: Hous-
ing Adjustments and Barriers to Social and Economic Adaptation among Georgia's Rural
Latinos, 19 S. RURAL Soc. 97, 100-01 (2003) (describing camas calientes as "indicative of
Latino immigrants" dissatisfaction with their current housing and desire for living conditions
closer to the American housing norms").
Ito Mary E. Odem, Unsettled in the Suburbs: Latino Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in
Metro Atlanta, in TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GATEWAYS: IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBUR-
BAN AMERICA 105, 126 (Audrey Singer et al. eds., 2008). Like Cherokee County, Gwinnett
County also took non-housing restriction measures to limit the number of undocumented im-
migrants. See Tom Opdyke, Cobb Toughens Law on Occupants in One Home, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., July 25, 2007, at B5 [hereinafter Cobb Toughens Law]. County officials passed laws
requiring all businesses that enter into contracts with the county to verify that all of their
employees are legal residents. Id.
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the complaints were about immigrants.' 1 ' In 2009, Gwinnett County
took further steps to limit housing occupancy by changing its definition
of family.112 The former definition of family stated: "One or more per-
sons related by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardianship; or not more
than three persons not so related who live together in a dwelling unit ...
or not more than two unrelated persons and any minor children related to
either of them."" 3 The change focused on how to obtain a Special Use
Permit if a household consisted of "groups of more than three persons
who are not related by blood or marriage."114 As justification for the
change, the county cited its 300 complaints per year regarding over-
crowding in single-family residential areas, and the effect on these com-
plaints by the newly established Gwinnett State College."t 5
In neighboring Cobb County, many residents complained of the
emergence of overcrowded boarding houses occupied by immigrant
workers, their families, and their friends." 6 One code enforcement of-
ficer noted that at least 95% of the complaints were made by white re-
sidents complaining about Latino residents."~7 In response to these
complaints, Cobb County commissioners altered the housing ordi-
nance." 8 The old housing ordinance allowed for unlimited residents in
the same house, so long as the members of the household were related to
one another.1 9 The new housing ordinance required a minimum of fifty
square feet of sleeping space per person regardless of relationship be-
tween the members of the household.120 In 2007, Cobb County passed a
111 Odem, supra note 110, at 126. Some of the code enforcement officers are armed
police officers. Tom Opdyke, Armed Police Enforce Codes: Cobb Targets Quality of Life,
ATLANTA J.-CONsT., Sept. 16, 2007, at ZH1 [hereinafter Armed Police Enforce Codes].
112 See Gwinnett County, Ga., Ordinance to Amend the 1985 Zoning Resolution of Gwin-
nett County to Redefine the Term "Family" and to Revise Provisions Concerning Variances
From the Definition of the Term "Family" 2 (May 26, 2009) [hereinafter Gwinnett County
Zoning Resolution] available at http://www.gwinnettcounty.com/static/departments/planning/
pdf/zoning-.resolutionamendment 2009_001.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Id. The county added the right to obtain a variance from this definition of family if an
applicant faces unnecessary hardship because of the ordinance, if the group requesting the
variance is between four and eight persons who live as a single housing unit and would find it
economically prohibitive to live in a group of three or fewer, the housing unit contains at least
eighty square feet of bedroom space per occupant, the housing unit has functioning utilities,
and the area the housing unit is built upon contains at least one-half acre and at least 1,200
square feet of paved parking. Id. at 3.
'15 Id. at 1-2.
116 Odem, supra note 110, at 126. Cobb County residents attempted to deflect any criti-
cism that they were targeting undocumented immigrants or singling out Latinos by stating that
the county wanted to limit college-student-occupied boarding houses and noting that there are
white, black and Hispanic boarding houses. See Cobb Toughens Law, supra note 110.
117 Id.
1'8 Odem, supra note 110, at 126.
''9 Id.
120 Id.
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more restrictive housing ordinance requiring at least 390 square feet of
space for each adult occupant, and for each car parked overnight at the
residence. 121 "Family" was also restricted to include only parents, chil-
dren, siblings, grandparents, and grandchildren. 12 2
The City of Roswell in Fulton County took measures similar to both
Gwinnett and Cobb counties. The city council narrowed its definition of
persons qualifying as a family and adopted a more restrictive housing
ordinance in order to eliminate boarding houses in single-family neigh-
borhoods.123 In July 2006 the city council approved a new housing ordi-
nance restricting each residence to no more than three unrelated
occupants in one single-family home and eliminating cousins as relatives
in the definition of family. 12 4
Municipal ordinances targeting overcrowding through square-foot-
age mandates and family definitions represent, arguably, a greater obsta-
cle to immigrant communities than Hazleton-style IIRAs. First,
municipal overcrowding ordinances that fail to include any specific ref-
erences to undocumented immigrants do not capture the attention of
rights groups the way traditional AIHOs like Hazleton-style IIRAs do
because they are technically applicable to any resident in violation. As
we have seen, however, occupancy ordinances are generally used to tar-
get undocumented immigrants, and county and municipal officials have
revised their respective property maintenance codes to make the regula-
tions more restrictive. Potential challenges to housing ordinances also
face an uphill battle in court because courts are deferential to property
maintenance codes so long as they fail to implicate federal powers di-
rectly or trigger more searching judicial inquiries by implicating funda-
mental rights questions. In short, state powers provide counties and
municipalities broad legal cover and deferential treatment in court as
long as a municipality can show that the ordinances are enacted for the
purposes of protecting the health and safety of the community. As a
result, while Hazleton-style IIRAs are challenged around the nation,
rights groups are scrambling for legal tools and struggling to gain com-
121 Cobb Toughens Law, supra note 110; Odem, supra note 110, at 126. For example, no
more than four adults would be permitted to legally live in a 1,600-square-foot home. Cobb
Toughens Law, supra note 110.
Cobb County police officers involved in code enforcement are members of the "Quality
of Life" unit. Armed Police Enforce Codes, supra note 111. The Cobb code enforcement
officials also conduct criminal checks and have arrested more than sixty individuals for misde-
meanor or felonies. Armed Police Enforce Codes, supra note 111. As of September 7, 2007,
Cobb enforcement officers had issued at least two citations and more than forty warnings
pursuant to its overcrowding ordinance. Id.
122 Odem, supra note 110, at 126.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 127. An editorial in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution applauded the efforts to
restrict undocumented immigrants in suburbs like Roswell. Odem, supra note 110, at 127.
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munal support in order to properly confront what they perceive as selec-
tive property maintenance code enforcement.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
A. The Current Legal Regime
The current legal regime is replete with litigation strategies to con-
test both kinds of AIHOs. Yet the legal doctrines that form the basis to
challenge AIHOs like Hazleton-style IRAs are much more successful
than those used to challenge the occupancy ordinaces, and the legal doc-
trines do not cross-apply to one another.
1. Preemption
As the court rulings in Hazleton, Farmers Branch, and Escondido
demonstrate, preemption doctrine is an effective tool against AIHOs like
Hazleton-style IIRAs.125 However, some scholars, like Professor
Oliveri, argue that preemption is an unstable doctrine incapable of con-
sistently invalidating IIRAs. 126 Succinctly, "there is no guarantee that
future courts will find these ordinances preempted." 127 He points to the
Farmers Branch decision as being limited to its facts and that decisions
on local IIRAs, with respect to housing, may not be consistent with Ha-
zleton because housing is traditionally a state interest and thus an appli-
cation of field preemption doctrine is much more questionable. 128
Professor Oliveri specifically points to occupancy restrictions for single-
family residences because courts have consistently upheld such restric-
tions where "family" definitions do not run afoul of Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas.129
Professor Oliveri also argues that conflict preemption is unstable
ground on which to base an attack on IRAs.130 He notes that preemp-
tion requires the "'impossibility of dual compliance' with both state and
federal law."13' Moreover, IIRAs simply target people who already have
the burden of proving their legal status under federal immigration law. 1 3 2
125 For a similar perspective, see Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. Chi. Legal
F. 27, 29 (arguing that "here is no compelling reason to discard the preemption power, as it
retains its common law and statutory vitality").
126 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 68.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 68-69.
129 See id (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
130 See id. at 70.
131 Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963)).
132 Id.
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They merely prevent individuals from entering into a lease until their
legal status has been verified.133
Although Professor Oliveri expresses important reservations about
preemption doctrine as a basis for challenging IIRAs, his fears have not
yet been realized. With the exception of Valley Park, Missouri's ordi-
nance, preemption challenges to local AIHOs have not failed.134 Yet,
even in Valley Park, the court dismissed the case with respect to the
housing-related aspects of the ordinance after the city removed all such
references.135 The provisions that the court concluded were not pre-
empted were related to business licensing laws. 136
Although some confidence is warranted with respect to the success-
ful application of preemption doctrine in the immigration and housing
context, the Ninth Circuit's decision in the appeal of United States v.
Arizona,137 if contrary to the Third Circuit decision in Lozano II, may
force the Supreme Court to revisit preemption doctrine yet again.138
During its October 2010 term, the Supreme Court heard argument in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, which was an appeal from the Ninth
Circuit decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano.13 9 In
Chicanos Por La Causa, the Ninth Circuit held that the Immigration Re-
133 See id.
134 See Gray v. City of Valley Park, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, at *59-60 (E.D. Mo.
Jan. 31, 2008). Without conducting any substantive studies of the local immigrant population,
Valley Park's all-white board stated that the city found "that illegal immigration leads to
higher crime rates, contributes to overcrowded classrooms and failing schools, and destroys
our neighborhoods and diminishes our overall quality of life." See Kristen Hinman, Valley
Park to Mexican Immigrants: "Adios, Illegals!", RIVERFRONT TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, available
at http://www.riverfronttimes.com/2007-02-28/news/valley-park-to-mexican-immigrants-
adios-illegals (quoting Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance No. 1708 (July 17, 2006), available at
http://www.valleyparkmo.org/docs/Ordinances/Ordinance%201708.pdf). The mayor, Jeffery
Whitteaker, declared that the ordinance's purpose was to stem the flow of immigrants into the
community-stating, "You got one guy and his wife that settle down here, have a couple kids,
and before long you have Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco Whoever moving in." Oliveri, supra
note 6, at 80; see Hinman, supra. The mayor also made sure to distinguish Valley Park's
Asian community by pointing out their friendly disposition. See Hinman, supra. Despite the
legislation, Valley Park's Latino community barely comprises two percent (a relatively stable
percentage) of a population of 6,518, with little indication of growth. Id.
135 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 61 n.16; see also Margo Schlanger, Case Summary: Gray
v. City of Valley Park, CrviL RIGHTS LrrlG. CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 16, 2008), http://www.
clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9476&search=source-general;caseName-valley%20park;
orderby-caseState,%20caseName.
136 Gray, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7238, at *55-60.
137 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010) (granting in part and denying in part the
United States' motion for preliminary injunction).
138 During its October 2010 term the Supreme Court heard argument in Chamber of Com-
merce v. Whiting, which was an appeal from the Ninth Circuit decision in Chicanos Por La
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008), holding that the Immigration Reform
and Control Act did not expressly or impliedly preempt an Arizona statute that made the use of
E-Verify mandatory. Id. at 864-66.
139 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008).
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form and Control Act was not an express preemption of an Arizona stat-
ute that made the use of E-Verify, an employment registration program,
mandatory.140 The court also concluded that Congress did not impliedly
preempt the Arizona statute either.141
A thorough discussion of the relationship between Lozano II, Chica-
nos Por La Causa, and Arizona is beyond the scope of this Note. Yet, a
cursory review of all three cases demonstrates the variety of contexts in
which a court could apply preemption doctrine. Moreover, Chicanos Por
La Causa and Arizona (especially if the Ninth Circuit follows its own
lead in Chicanos Por La Causa and concludes that SB 1070 is not pre-
empted) are, at least superficially, distinguishable from Lozano II. First,
the Supreme Court may give deference to state-level decisions to enter
the field of immigration regulation, especially since field preemption
analysis is the most permissive of the three standards. And secondly, by
targeting immigrant housing, municipalities like Hazleton, at least argua-
bly, go much farther than the Arizona statutes. Succinctly, a community
that bars people from living within its borders does more to banish them
from a given geographical place than a community that bars them from
working there. Employment laws engender debates that have gone on in
U.S. history since the last quarter of the nineteenth century. On the other
hand, AIHOs are from a much more recent tradition in U.S. history with
roots in the 1950s: housing discrimination.
B. Occupancy Ordinances
Immigrant rights activists challenging occupancy ordinances that
are ordinarily a part of property maintenance codes are unable to make
use of preemption doctrine in their challenges because occupancy ordi-
nances do not specifically single out any group of people. 142 Instead,
occupancy ordinances are either selectively-enforced or amended so the
enforcement can be tailored to single out a select group of people, like
immigrants. 143 Although the examples above clearly show the usage of
such ordinances for anti-immigrant purposes, immigrant rights activists
and immigrant communities have more difficulty garnering attention and
support for this cause.144 Undoubtedly, the prevalence of Hazleton-style
ordinances make challenges to occupancy ordinances far less likely be-
cause they, arguably, represent a less critical threat to immigrant commu-
nities. Yet, any serious analysis of AIHOs fails to provide a clear picture
140 Id. at 864-66.
141 Id. at 866-67.
142 See discussion infra Parts II.B. .a.-2.
143 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
144 See discussion infra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes.
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if it avoids examining occupancy ordinances and their respective under-
lying legal doctrines.
1. Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), at first blush, appears to be where
parties challenging occupancy ordinances could turn in order to bring
their claims. Yet despite its significant protection against discrimination,
the Fair Housing Act (FHA) is not a very effective tool against occu-
pancy ordinances.14 5 Section 3604(a) makes it unlawful to refuse to ne-
gotiate the price of, sell, rent, receive offers, deny, or otherwise make
unavailable "a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin." 46 The federal provision also
applies to eviction.147 Like subsection (a) of § 3604, subsection (b) pro-
hibits discrimination against persons in the negotiation of, sale, or rental,
of a dwelling, or in the provision of services to that dwelling on the basis
of "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."' 4  Sec-
tion 3604(b)'s extension of 3604(a) ensures that both provisions apply to
the most common forms of discriminatory actions in housing, such as
offering different lease terms on the basis of race or different levels of
service to renters or owners.14 9
The provisions in § 3604 are extended further by § 3617's protec-
tions. Section 3617 specifically reinforces § 3604 by making it unlawful
to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exer-
cise or enjoyment of' their rights under § 3604, because they have al-
ready exercised their rights under § 3604, or because someone else has
assisted a person in exercising their rights under § 3604.150 According to
Professor Rigel Oliveri, § 3617 thus protects "[h]ousing providers or
their employees" who often bring claims against persons attempting to
coerce or intimidate them as a result of their assistance of housing buy-
ers, renters, or sellers.'51
Most courts have used the FHA as a basis for recognizing a cause of
action for disparate impact in the housing sector.152 There is a split
among the circuits, however, with the Second Circuit adopting a less
rigorous test than other circuits.' 5 3 In Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire
145 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006).
146 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
147 See id.; Oliveri, supra note 6, at 82.
148 § 3604(b).
149 See id.; Oliveri, supra note 6, at 82.
150 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2000).
151 Oliveri, supra note 6, at 83.
152 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 727 (3d ed. 2005).
153 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 94-95.
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Dept.,154 the Second Circuit characterized disparate impact analysis as a
doctrine applicable to "facially neutral policies or practices that may
have a discriminatory effect."1 55 A plaintiff basing a discrimination
claim on disparate impact doctrine must demonstrate "(1) the occurrence
of certain outwardly neutral practices, and (2) a significantly adverse or
disproportionate impact on persons of a particular type produced by the
defendant's facially neutral acts or practices."156 Noticeably absent from
the Second Circuit's analysis is the need for a plaintiff to prove that the
discrimination was intentional. 57 The plaintiff must, however, prove
that the "practice 'actually or predictably results in . . . discrimina-
tion' "158 and that the facially neutral policy and discriminatory effect are
causally connected.159 A plaintiff will not meet her burden by simply
raising an "inference of discriminatory impact."' 60 A plaintiff that suc-
cessfully meets her burden "shifts [the burden] to the defendant to 'prove
that its actions furthered, in theory and in practice, a legitimate, bona fide
governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest
with less discriminatory effect.' "161 If a defendant proves that its actions
furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that it had no
alternative that would serve the same purposes, a court is not at liberty to
balance the discriminatory impact against the importance of the govern-
ment's rationale; the plaintiff simply loses the argument.162
In the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, courts follow a
more complex disparate impact analysis as set forth in Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington
Heights II) that tends to disfavor plaintiffs bringing such claims.163 Pro-
fessor Oliveri succinctly described the Arlington Heights II test as requir-
ing that a court balance four factors:
(1) whether there is a disparate impact on a protected
group; (2) whether there is any evidence that the munici-
pal action is, in fact, intentional, or motivated in any part
154 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003).
155 Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't., 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003).
156 Id. at 574-75.
157 Id. at 575 (citing Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
934-36 (2d Cir. 1988)).
158 Id. at 575 (quoting Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 90 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
159 Id. at 575 (citing Hack, 237 F.3d at 90).
160 id. at 575 (citing Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1997)).
161 Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 575 (quoting Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 936). The
Huntington Branch Court decided that they would not require defendants to prove that their
actions furthered a compelling state interest-the standard for cases of intentional discrimina-
tion. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 152 at 708.
162 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 152 at 708 (citing Langlois v Abington Hous. Auth.,
207 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2000), as an example).
163 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 94-95.
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by discriminatory animus; (3) whether there is a legiti-
mate economic or public safety rationale for the munici-
pality's action; and (4) whether the plaintiff is requesting
that the municipality provide her with housing, or
whether she merely wishes for the municipality to stop
interfering with her ability to obtain housing for
herself.164
Unlike the Second Circuit test, the second prong of the Arlington
Heights test makes a plaintiffs evidence of intentional discrimination
relevant to the analysis of whether she has proven disparate impact.' 65
Although both tests make it exceedingly difficult to make out a
claim of disparate impact, the Arlington Heights II test narrows the class
of plaintiffs capable of proving disparate impact much more so than the
Second Circuit's test. For example, plaintiffs establish a prima facie case
under the FHA if they fall under one of the FHA's protected classes. 16 6
Yet, for legal immigrants or Latinos challenging municipal overcrowding
ordinances that "appear" to single out the Latino community, proving
that the discrimination was based on race or national origin would be
nearly impossible if courts applied the Arlington Heights II test and inter-
preted the second prong to mean that the plaintiff has to provide evidence
of intentional discrimination. On the other hand, a court applying the
Second Circuit test to stepped-up enforcement efforts in Virginia would
provide a plaintiff with a much more viable legal claim because in-
creased enforcement would arguably satisfy the Second Circuit's second
prong of disproportionate impact, and Second Circuit plaintiffs do not
need to prove intentional discrimination. Yet, applying the Second Cir-
cuit test to stepped-up enforcement efforts in Georgia might be only mar-
ginally more successful because the increased enforcement would satisfy
the second prong of the disproportionate impact test, and plaintiffs do not
need to prove that the discrimination was intentional.
Yet, for unauthorized immigrants, the situation is much more peril-
ous because the FHA does not protect against discrimination based on
alienage or legal status. 16 7 Therefore, unless unauthorized immigrant
claims could be attached to claims against Latinos (which they cannot),
unauthorized immigrants challenging an ordinance on a disparate impact
theory based on race or national origin discrimination would hardly be
taken seriously in a court of law. Therefore, the current state of the law
leaves unauthorized immigrants precariously relying on legal immigrant
164 See Oliveri, supra note 6, at 95; see also Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-93 (7th Cir. 1977).
165 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 152 at 707.
166 Id.
167 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 83-84.
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challenges to discriminatory municipal ordinances and practices, already
a monumental hurdle under a disparate impact analysis, instead of assert-
ing their own legal claims.
a. The FHA, Maximum Occupancy, and Family
The FHA's legal utility is even further eviscerated against occu-
pancy ordinances and restrictive familial definitions by the FHA's
§ 3607(b)(1). Section 3607(b)(1) of Title 42 renders unchallengeable
(via exemption) state and local laws that are "reasonable .. . restrictions"
on the maximum occupancy of a dwelling. 168 Courts have given mean-
ing to the reasonableness language of 3607(b)(1) by stating that city ordi-
nances are reasonable (and thus exempt from FHA challenges) if the
ordinance appears to "apply uniformly to all residents of all dwelling
units." 69 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to include
maximum occupancy restrictions that are "plainly and unmistakably"
used to prevent overcrowding.170 Thus, plaintiffs challenging total occu-
pancy limits designed to protect municipalities against overcrowding in
dwellings face an insurmountable obstacle in § 3607.171 Moreover, a
state's enactment of economic or social welfare regulations as an exer-
cise of its police powers is presumptively valid.172 Courts also give def-
erential treatment to state and municipal legislative decisions specifying
the maximum number of individuals or the minimum number of feet for
the occupancy provision.173 On the other hand, the § 3607(b)(1) exemp-
tion does not apply to an ordinance "designed to preserve the family
character of a neighborhood, fastening on the composition of households
rather than on the total number of occupants living quarters can con-
tain."174 Also, parties seeking to use the § 3607(b)(1) exemption from
the FHA's restrictions bear the burden of demonstrating that they are
168 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (2006).
169 Id. at 636 (emphasis added) (quoting Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d
249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that municipalities have "a legitimate interest in decreas-
ing congestion, traffic, and noise in residential areas, and ordinances restricting the number of
unrelated individuals who may occupy a single family residence are reasonably related to these
legitimate goals").
170 See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 734 (1995) ("Section
3607(b)(1)'s language-'restrictions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to
occupy a dwelling'-surely encompasses maximum occupancy restrictions. . . . In sum, rules
that cap the total number of occupants in order to prevent overcrowding of a dwelling 'plainly
and unmistakably,' fall within § 3607(b)(1)'s absolute exemption from the FHA's govern-
ance." (citations omitted)); ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 152, at 728.
'17 Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Richmond Heights, 209 F.3d 626, 633
(6th Cir. 2000).
172 Id. at 635.
173 Id. at 636 ("Every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have
been included. That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative, not a judicial, function."
(quoting Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996)).
174 Oxford House, 514 U.S. at 735.
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entitled to the exemption.17 5 Thus, parties are more likely to lead suc-
cessful challenges against newly enacted local-level ordinances if local
authorities mix maximum occupancy and family in their definitions, and
local officials appear to be attempting to preserve the family character of
their neighborhood.
In City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc.,' 7 6 for example, the Su-
preme Court concluded that an ordinance that stated "occupants of sin-
gle-family residence units must compose a 'family,'" which was defined
as "an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or
marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons who are not related by
genetics, adoption, or marriage," was not entitled to the § 3607(b)(1) ex-
emption from FHA regulations.177 Other serious challenges to maximum
occupancy ordinances would also have to be litigated on facts that sug-
gest that the ordinances would unreasonably restrict the use of single-
family residences by protected groups.
Challenging ordinances based on § 3607(b)(1) would therefore have
mixed results, at best. Before Manassas abandoned its 2006 family defi-
nition, the city likely would have qualified for the § 3607(b)(1) exemp-
tion because its familial definition appeared to apply to all residents in
all dwelling units and did not appear to mix both familial limits and total
occupancy restrictions (even if it looked like an attempt to preserve the
"family" character of the neighborhood). A party challenging Herndon,
Virginia's restrictions, on the other hand, might be more successful.
Hermdon's restriction on the number of family members living in one
household irrespective of household size could conceivably run afoul of
the FHA's guidelines and not be exempt under § 3607(b)(1) because it
appears to be an attempt to preserve the family character of Herndon, and
the ordinance fastens on the composition of households rather than on
the total number of occupants in living quarters. Loudon County's re-
strictions both limiting the number of individuals to four per single-fam-
ily dwelling unit and at least fifty square feet per person, per bedroom
would easily meet the standards under § 3607(b)(1). Increased enforce-
ment in Prince William County, although selective, would also fail to
create a cause of action under the FHA because the county's more per-
missive definitions remain the basis for the enforcement. Although
Georgia's Gwinnett County also increased enforcement of existing occu-
pancy limits in response to a surge in residents complaining of over-
crowding, 78 an FHA-based cause of action would need substantially
175 Fair Hous. Advocates Ass'n, 209 F.3d at 634.
176 Oxford House, 514 U.S. at 729.
177 Id. at 725.
178 See Odem, supra note 110, at 126. Like Cherokee County, Gwinnett County also took
non-housing measures to limit the number of undocumented immigrants. See Cobb Toughens
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more in order to be a meritable claim. Cobb County, Georgia's require-
ment of 390 feet of space per person17 9 would be worthy of more atten-
tion under § 3607(b)(1) because the 390-foot requirement is substantially
higher than most square foot restrictions. A court likely would uphold
Roswell's restrictions to three persons180 unless the plaintiff could prove
that the ordinance's restrictions were tied to some other form of discrimi-
nation prohibited under § 3604(a). It is important to note that the hypo-
thetical success predicted above in this paragraph is little more than
speculation. Thus, the FHA and the caselaw interpreting it provide few
successful challenges to overcrowding ordinances that appear to be se-
lectively enforced against immigrants. These ordinances likely represent
the new direction of AIHOs due to their robust ability to withstand legal
challenges.
2. Equal Protection
Like FHA restrictions on occupancy ordinances, equal protection
challenges to occupancy ordinances are also not very effective. In Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
(Arlington Heights 1),' 81 the Supreme Court held that judicial deference
to a legislative decision is unjustified if "there is [ ] proof that a discrimi-
natory purpose" is a motivating factor. 182 Evidence of discriminatory
purpose may provide a "starting point" if an official action "bears more
heavily on one race than another."l 83 Despite facially-neutral state ac-
tion, a pattern may emerge that is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race."' 84 The court added, however, that such cases are rare.185 Accord-
ing to Professors Robert Ellickson and Vicki Been "[t]he small numbers
of plaintiffs who successfully prove discriminatory intent might suggest
that the problems of proof Arlington Heights I poses are virtually insur-
mountable."186 Even proving discriminatory purpose on the part of leg-
Law, supra note 110. County officials passed laws requiring all businesses that enter contracts
with the county to verify that all of their employees are legal residents. Id.
179 Odem, supra note 110, at 126.
180 Id.
181 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights 1), 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
182 Id. at 265-66.
183 Id. at 266 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
184 Id.
185 Id. For an assessment of the challenges of proving legislative motive, see Paul Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive,
1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95, 120-24; see also Alan E. Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the
Municipal Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1988) (examining illicit
legislative motive and creating a framework for determining whether an analysis of motive
should take place based on (1) the need, (2) feasibility, (3) practical and political conse-
quences, and (4) value).
186 ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 152, at 702 (emphasis added).
"THERE BE No SHELTER HERE"
islators only shifts the burden to the defendant to establish that the
defendant would have reached the same decision had the discriminatory
purpose not been a motivating factor.' 87
Applying those standards to the changes to family definitions and
occupancy ordinances, a Court might conclude that some of the claims
have merit, but such cases would be difficult to prove unless legislators
discussing the ordinance in legislative hearings prior to its enactment in-
cluded especially targeted rhetoric towards immigrants or Latinos. Even
if legislators made substantial references to illegal aliens in the legisla-
tive history, and a court found discriminatory intent, a municipality could
still cite social, economic, and public safety reasons for enacting the or-
dinance and ensure for their ordinance less exacting judicial scrutiny.
M. ALTERNATIVE LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY STRATEGIES
The limited utility of the challenges above to AIHOs demonstrates
that alternative legal and public policy strategies might significantly con-
tribute to neutralizing anti-immigrant actions at the local level. Legal
alternatives, in addition to preemption doctrine, must challenge occu-
pancy ordinances specifically enforced against immigrants while respect-
ing local control over property maintenance. Likewise, effective public
policy strategies must balance national interests in neutralizing anti-im-
migrant legislation and sentiment while respecting state police power-
an undoubtedly Herculean feat.18 8
A. Legal Alternatives
1. Hazleton-style AlOs
Although courts have applied preemption doctrine to invalidate Ha-
zleton-style AIOs with relative consistency, Congress and courts should
make preemption a more robust doctrine. Although it would be a decid-
edly difficult solution, congressional legislation placing immigration
squarely within the first or second test under preemption doctrine would
substantially improve faith in the doctrine with respect to challenges to
state and local ordinances accused of regulating immigration. Congres-
sional language clearly stating that any state or local ordinance that
plainly implicates immigrants (both legal and undocumented), targets
immigrants, or attempts to police immigration, is invalid and explicitly
functions as an impermissible regulation of immigration pursuant to the
187 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights 1), 429 U.S.
252, 271 n.21 (1977).
188 Cristina Rodrfguez has advanced a similar argument in her article but she goes much
farther by arguing that immigration should be seen as a state interest. See infra note 212 and
accompanying text. My argument here is much narrower because I focus on anti-immigrant
housing ordinances (AIHOs).
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first test in preemption doctrine.18 9 As an alternative, Congress could
use the second test, field preemption, to declare its intent to "effect a
complete ouster of state power-including state power to promulgate
laws not in conflict with federal laws with respect to the subject matter
which the statute attempts to regulate." 190 If court and administrative
agency interpretation of such legislation could withstand the inevitable
challenges, reinforcing preemption doctrine with congressional action
might prove very effective.
2. Occupancy Ordinances
Although the disparate impact test is not a reliable tool in challeng-
ing occupancy ordinances, the more permissive Second Circuit disparate
impact test should be adopted by all circuits. This would eliminate the
confusion of the Arlington Heights II test by removing the question of
whether or not evidence of intentional discrimination would be necessary
to prove a claim of disparate impact. 191
189 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 765 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (citing League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 768
(C.D. Cal. 1995)). Professor Oliveri makes a similar argument: "Congress should enact legis-
lation explicitly preempting states and localities from enacting such restrictions." Oliveri,
supra note 6, at 121. But Professor Oliveri's reasoning for such a policy is based on his
argument that preemption doctrine is inherently unstable and not very effective as a tool for
challenging anti-immigrant housing ordinances. He states, in pertinent part:
[P]reemption is a risky and unsatisfying approach for several reasons. First, there is
no guarantee that future courts will find these ordinances preempted. The Farmers
Branch ruling appears to be limited to its facts, and it is entirely possible that future
courts will break with Hazleton and find that local All housing provisions are not
preempted at all. Express field preemption is clearly out of the question given the
absence of federal law on immigration-related housing restrictions. Implied field
preemption is also problematic because while the power to regulate immigration has
historically been a federal prerogative, states and municipalities have long been rec-
ognized to possess the authority to regulate housing as part of their police power.
Oliveri, supra note 6, at 68-69. Courts have proven his conclusions, with respect to Farmers
Branch, incorrect based on the most recent decision. See supra note 50-58 and accompanying
text. Mark Grube argues that an expansion of preemption doctrine with respect to the first De
Canas test, express preemption, would be "an overly expansive view of what constitutes immi-
gration regulation" and "could lead to the federal immigration power preempting a wide vari-
ety of local legislation, such as sanctuary laws and day-labor centers." Grube, supra note 8, at
425. This is, without question a reasonable concern, but in the express preemption context, it
is difficult to see an alternative.
190 Villas at Parkside Partners, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (citing Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 at
768). By contrast, Grube argues that "courts should not rely on a field-preemption theory to
strike down local immigration ordinances: courts could only accomplish this with an overly
expansive field definition that would result in localities' losing the ability to regulate in a wide
variety of areas in which they have a strong interest." Grube, supra note 8, at 424. Although
an important concern, courts have shown themselves more than capable of using field preemp-
tion and applying it in a fairly reasonable manner. See discussion supra Part I.A.
191 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights [hereinafter Arlington
Heights II], 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (1977); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 95.
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Although equal protection challenges under Arlington Heights I are
rarely effective, the Equal Protection Clause provides other grounds to
challenge discrimination. Class-of-one claims, a relatively new cause of
action, 192 and a wider application of them in the housing context, would
provide yet another tool to challenge discriminatory application of maxi-
mum occupancy ordinances. In a class-of-one analysis, plaintiffs must
"show (1) that they were treated differently from other similarly situated
individuals, and (2) that [a] [d]efendant unequally applied a facially neu-
tral ordinance for the purpose of discriminating against [p]laintiffs."l 93
Plaintiffs need not be a member of a protected class to assert a class-of-
one claim. 194 If applied with greater frequency, class-of-one claims
could conceivably mitigate the difficulty of bringing a cause of action on
a disparate impact theory. Although courts apply rational basis review to
class-of-one claims, a plaintiff would not have the difficulty of offering
evidence of a "significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on per-
sons of a particular type" mandated by the second prong of the Second
Circuit disparate impact test. 195
B. Public Policy Solutions
A successful public policy strategy involving housing and immigra-
tion must grapple with (1) state and federal interests and (2) the effect
that AIOs, especially AIHOs, have on lawfully-present immigrants. Al-
though we could dismiss AIOs as ephemeral strategies by provincial,
isolated communities, we cannot deny that local concerns like property
values and safety merit at least some attention.19 6 Moreover, state and
192 See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (recognizing a class-of-
one claim: "Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class-
of-one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.").
193 Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11 th Cir. 2006) (referencing Strick-
land v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (1 Ith Cir. 1996)). See generally David S. Cheval, Student
Works, By the Way - The Equal Protection Clause Has Always Protected a "Class-of-One":
An Examination of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 593 (2002) (examin-
ing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000), and its possible effect on litigation).
As David Cheval notes, courts apply rational basis to a "class-of-one" claim. Cheval, supra, at
606; see also Olech, 528 U.S. at 564 ("Our cases have recognized successful equal protection
claims brought by a 'class-of-one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.").
194 See Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1314.
195 Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep't., 352 F.3d 565, 574-75 (2d Cir. 2003).
196 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PuB. No. 2500, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMI.
GRANTS ON THE BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 9-10 (2007), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8711/12-6-Immigration.pdf [hereinafter UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS AND STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS] (noting that despite federal assistance to state
and local governments, the costs that state and local governments incur for the services that
they provide unauthorized immigrants are not outweighed by the tax revenue that they gener-
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local governments that pass AIHOs, or reinforce existing occupancy or-
dinances, potentially impose both negative and positive externalities on
their neighbors. 19 7
One useful solution would be to further separate the spheres of fed-
eral and state control in our federalist system. Congress could accom-
plish this by increasing the role of the federal government in protecting
classes of individuals prone to harassment and abuse, and decreasing the
federal government's role in housing by giving states greater latitude to
govern such matters pursuant to their traditional state powers. One way
of implementing such a solution would be for Congress to mandate that
states implement fair housing acts that extend protection to individuals
based on alienage and legal status.198 States could also adopt statewide
housing codes or occupancy ordinance provisions that limit amendments
on the local level.
Professor Oliveri has argued that the only way to truly mitigate the
discrimination that accompanies Hazleton-style AlOs would be to add
alienage and legal status as protected classes under the FHA because
failing to protect those classes leaves national origin minorities ex-
posed.199 He observed that:
neither alienage (whether or not a person is a U.S. citi-
zen) nor legal status (whether or not a noncitizen is le-
gally present in the United States, and, if so, under what
type of status) are specified in the [FHA]. As a result,
both public and private actors are largely free to discrim-
inate on these bases, at least as far as the FHA is
concerned.200
ate from unauthorized immigrants). The Congressional Budget Office study narrowly focuses
on the effect of unauthorized immigrants on state and local government budgets in the educa-
tion, health care, and law enforcement sectors. A more interesting study might broaden its
analysis of the fiscal effects unauthorized immigrants create by also discussing the impact
unauthorized immigrants have on the local economy. Compare UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS
AND STATE AND LocAL BUDGETS, supra, with Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 72 (discussing
the effect of AIHOs on the Riverside, New Jersey economy: "With the departure of so many
people, the local economy suffered. Hair salons, restaurants and corner shops that catered to
the immigrants saw business plummet; several closed. Once-boarded-up storefronts downtown
were boarded up again.").
197 See Rodrfguez, supra note 11, at 572 (arguing that both local and federal government
have authoritative roles to play in the immigration process).
198 Professor Oliveri suggests a similar argument, but argues that protection for alienage
and national origin classifications should be extended through the FHA. See Oliveri supra
note 6, at 122-23.
199 Oliveri, supra note 6, at 86. Professor Oliveri also rightfully observes that approxi-
mately one-third of families with immigrants are "mixed status families" that have both un-
documented immigrants and legal immigrants. Id. at 98 (citing JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW
HisPANIc CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULA-
TION IN THE U.S. 2 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
200 Oliveri, supra note 6, at 83-84.
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The result is that "landlord[s] who [wish] to discriminate against
national origin minorities may adopt a 'citizens only' policy." 201 Profes-
sor Oliveri's observation that national origin minorities remain exposed
without further protection is compelling.
Still, a superior approach would be congressional legislation man-
dating that states implement fair housing acts as noted above, or amend
state fair housing acts (SFHAs) already on the books, to include alienage
and legal status as protected from discrimination. For example, Vir-
ginia's Fair Housing laws, like the FHA, prohibit discrimination with
respect to "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, elderliness, familial
status, or handicap." 202 An amended formulation would add "alienage
and legal status." SFHAs that extend protection to alienage and legal
status would effectively end AIHOs as long as states did not promulgate
their own insurmountable legal doctrines like Arlington Heights II. Mu-
nicipalities and counties would no longer be able to pass AIHOs without
being directly challenged by SFHA actions. Ironically, state-level causes
of action, at least with respect to AIHOs, would effectively mirror their
federal counterparts. Plaintiffs could argue that an AIHO runs afoul of
the SFHA. Similarly, aggrieved parties could also argue that state law
preempts a municipal AIHO. 2 0 3
State preemption is, indeed, an effective argument in circumstances
where states adopt uniform housing codes and limit the ability of local
officials to amend those codes. These actions are not without precedent.
In Briseno v. City of Santa Ana,204 for example, a Santa Ana resident
challenged the city's occupancy requirements for dwelling units on pre-
emption grounds because the ordinance was stricter than the state occu-
pancy requirements. The court concluded that the state legislature
intended to preempt local occupancy ordinances. 205
State law enacted with these changes would further the interests of
immigrants, and authorities at the federal, state, and local level. On the
one hand, immigrants would be afforded substantially more protection
than the current legal regime provides them. More importantly, greater
protection could conceivably resolve the current mess that is the intersec-
201 Id. at 84-85.
202 VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 (2009).
203 See, e.g., Briseno v. City of Santa Ana, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(concluding that the state's Uniform Housing Law generally preempts local occupancy
ordinances).
204 See id.
205 See Briseno, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489. States did, however, provide local authorities with
the power to amend local occupancy ordinances, but only if "'local climatic, geological, or
topographical conditions' exist, and only if the municipality makes an express finding that
such conditions exist." See Briseno, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 489. This might be considered conflict
preemption because a local government that failed to follow these procedures would clearly
inhibit the state's ability to exercise state law.
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tion between immigration and housing and remove at least one element
of the immigration controversy. 206
States adopting these reforms would also benefit immigrants by not
interfering with state and local policy that already works to protect immi-
grant rights. California, for example, responded to the proliferation of
AIHOs by enacting legislation barring landlords from asking tenants
their legal status,207 and prohibiting municipalities from passing ordi-
nances forcing landlords to take such actions. 208 New York City also has
an ordinance prohibiting landlords from questioning tenants about their
legal status or discriminating against them. based on alienage or
citizenship. 209
Other scholars argue that a federal policy allowing states and locali-
ties more variation in their legal regimes with respect to their immigra-
tion populations could have potentially positive effects. Professor
Howard Chang argues that "federal authorization of divergent state poli-
cies [could be viewed as] creating laboratories of generosity toward im-
migrants." 210 Professor Peter Spiro advances a similar argument under
his "steam-valve" theory. 211 Professor Cristina Rodriguez argues that
206 It goes without saying that housing is only one small piece of the immigration contro-
versy. State and local authorities target undocumented immigrants through employment re-
strictions, law enforcement, language restrictions, and limited health care, to name a few
examples. Some scholars like Professor Rodriguez argue that the present anti-immigrant cli-
mate at the local legislative level "represent[s] a temporary and actually quite limited outburst
brought on by unusually high levels of unauthorized immigration and a hyperactive media
during a period of heightened national awareness of immigration." Rodriguez, supra note 11,
at 595. She adds that "[olnce the national debate has subsided (particularly if Congress passes
meaningful immigration reform in the next two years) most local communities will revert to
compromise positions of some sort, perhaps participating in 287(g) agreements while aban-
doning city-led enforcement measures such as landlord penalties." Id. The present economic
crisis, on the other hand, may make our present anti-immigrant climate permanent.
207 See Cal. Civ. Code § 1940.3(b) (2007); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 123.
208 See id.
209 N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8-107(5); Oliveri, supra note 6, at 123. Speaking to the
Senate Judiciary Committee in the summer of 2006 as the committee debated a house bill that
would penalize so-called sanctuary cities, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated
that "[a]lthough they broke the law by illegally crossing our borders or overstaying their visas,
our City's economy would be a shell of itself had they not, and it would collapse if they were
deported." Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 577 n.35.
210 Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 576 n.8; see also Grube, supra note 8, at 395 ("Courts
should resist the temptation to announce an overly broad preemption doctrine that would un-
dermine local governments' ability to legislate in areas where they have strong interests.").
211 See generally Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1627 (1997) (arguing that states that have strong anti-immigrant sentiments should be
allowed to pass such legislation on the local level so that the federal government could avoid
enacting such sentiments at the national level, and that under such a system of competitive
federalism state governments would have to weigh the benefits of such legislation against the
costs associated with them). Professor Olivas contrasts Professor Spiro's steam-valve theory
with his "hydraulic principle," in which power "flows between states and the federal govern-
ment: there is a constant tug between the two levels, in an almost-hydraulic relationship. As
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states and local governments are critical to the immigration debate be-
cause they are already tasked with the duty of integrating immigrants
into the "body politic." 2 1 2 Thus, promoting public policy that both re-
spects the rights of immigrants and that also acknowledges the important
role of the states would go a long way towards rectifying the shortcom-
ings of the current legal regime.
CONCLUSION
Although preemption doctrine has been relatively successful against
ordinances that specifically implicate immigration policy, it remains
deeply flawed because it fails to address back door immigration enforce-
ment like restrictive overcrowding and family ordinances in property
maintenance codes. And, as the case of Manassas has shown us, plain-
tiffs will not effectively challenge occupancy ordinances without wide-
spread organization by immigrants' rights activists. Beyond their blatant
effort to eliminate immigrants from their communities, municipalities
and counties in Virginia and Georgia fail to grasp the effect their efforts
have on surrounding communities.
Local efforts to curb immigrant-friendly housing may simply force
both the positive and negative externalities of immigration onto other
communities. 213 On the one hand, those communities might be rid of the
ills they associate with undocumented immigrants. Succinctly, the legal
regime in which local immigration regulation currently takes place al-
lows states to take advantage of the labor and economic benefit that im-
migrants bring to communities without bearing any of the costs that
families moving into a community incur-like housing, education, medi-
cal, and traffic congestion. Put more plainly, cities that pass Hazleton-
the federal piston pulls, state powers are accordingly diminished; as the state powers increase,
the fcdcral piston correspondingly decreases." See Olivas, supra note 125, at 30.
212 Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 571. More specifically, Rodriguez argues that "immigra-
tion regulation should be included in the list of quintessentially state interests, such as educa-
tion, crime control, and the regulation of health, safety, and welfare, not just because
immigration affects each of those interests, but also because managing immigrant movement is
itself a state interest." Id. Much smaller cities have also adopted innovative policies towards
immigrants. Id. at 578-79. New Haven, Connecticut, for example, has adopted a municipal
identification card that immigrants can use for access to both city and private services. Id. at
579.
213 See id. at 572. Scholars have conducted multiple studies on the benefits of immigra-
tion. The Third Circuit in Lozano v. City of Hazleton made a similar observation by first
noting that Hazleton clearly could not have intended to make undocumented immigrants
homeless:
No municipality would benefit from forcing any group of residents ("legal" or "ille-
gal") onto its streets. Rather, it appears plain that the purpose of [Hazleton's] hous-
ing provisions is to ensure that aliens lacking legal immigration status reside
somewhere other than Hazleton.
620 F.3d 170, 224 (3rd Cir. 2010).
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style AIOs or restrictive housing ordinances are attempting to free ride
on the labor and economic benefit of immigrants by forcing other cities
and counties with less restrictive property maintenance codes to bear all
or most of the costs. However, as Professor Rodriguez argues, cities that
pass AIOs are more likely to suffer economically from the absence of
immigrants.214 Thus, a more prudent approach would be for Congress to
pass legislation mandating that states pass SFHAs protecting alienage
and legal status in addition to national origin, and for states to pass occu-
pancy ordinances with reasonable requirements that allow for little
deviation. This would accommodate the current legal regime that tradi-
tionally grants states police power over matters like housing.
Although many immigrants and immigrant communities would be
adversely affected by such a policy in the short term and be forced to
"vote with their feet," few states would craft housing policies hostile to
immigrants in the long term because of the overwhelming economic cost
communities incur from AIO litigation and loss of business. 215 Accord-
ing to Professor Rodriguez, "many states and localities, when faced with
the consequences of their measures-namely, high legal fees, the disap-
pearance of immigrant populations that had revitalized dying former in-
dustrial towns, and the high administrative costs of enforcement-will
start reconsidering the extremity of their policies." 216
Moreover, instead of being caught moving from community to com-
munity as neighboring counties copy one another in passing AIOs or
narrower AIHOs, immigrants entering different states would have a bet-
ter perception of where native-born residents and communities would be
more hostile to their presence if immigration were regulated at the state
level. 2 17 For example, states with the greatest need for labor and eco-
nomic development would be more likely to promulgate immigrant-
friendly legislation. Thus, the proposed state laws would also ensure that
the distribution of externalities would flow not from fear and harassment,
214 Rodrfguez, supra note 11 at 595; Belson & Capuzzo, supra note 72 (quoting the
mayor, who stated that the city failed to consider the economic burden of the original ordi-
nance). Professor Spiro advances a similar argument and illustrates nicely how states that try
to pass anti-immigrant legislation often suffer a significant backlash in his discussion of Cali-
fornia's Proposition 187. See Spiro, supra note 211, at 1641-43. Arizona, no doubt, faces
similar problems because of the passage of SB 1070.
215 For an expanded discussion of this argument, see generally Spiro, supra note 211
(arguing that state and local governments should be allowed to pass legislation so that strong
anti-immigrant sentiments are not visited upon the entire country, and that allowing state and
local action would created an environment of competitive federalism).
216 Rodrfguez, supra note 11, at 595; Spiro, supra note 211, at 1640-41.
217 See Spiro, supra note 211, at 1640-41 ("Most important are the concrete economic
interests which would militate against adopting anti-alien measures. Leaving aside presumed
across-the-board corporate preferences for a greater supply of labor (rendered cheaper
thereby), foreign corporations might have an aversion to locating in states that appear unrecep-
tive to aliens in general, or to their nationals in particular.").
"THERE BE No SHELTER HERE"
but from a community's competitive advantage relative to its surround-
ing communities.218 Until meaningful reform takes place, however, "the
frontline [truly] is everywhere." 2 19
218 Id.
219 RAGE AGAINST THE MACHINE, No Shelter, on GODZLLA - THE ALBUM (Epic/Sony
Music Soundtrax 1998).
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